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Secret sharing is a procedure for splitting a message into several parts so that no subset of parts is
sufficient to read the message, but the entire set is. We show how this procedure can be implemented
using GHZ states. In the quantum case the presence of an eavesdropper will introduce errors so
that his presence can be detected. We also show how GHZ states can be used to split quantum
information into two parts so that both parts are necessary to reconstruct the original qubit.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice, who is in New York, wants to have an
action taken on her behalf in Prague. There she has two
agents, Bob and Charlie, who can carry it out for her,
but she knows that one of them, and only one, is dishon-
est, and she does not know which is the honest one. She
cannot simply send a message to both, because the dis-
honest one will try to sabotage the action, but she knows
that if the two of them carry out it together, the honest
one will keep the dishonest one from doing any damage.
What can she do?
Classical cryptography provides an answer which is
known as secret sharing [1]. It can be used, for exam-
ple, to guarantee that no single person can open a vault,
has access to an industrial secret, or can launch a mis-
sile with a nuclear warhead, but two together can. This
means that for security to be breached, two people must
act in concert, thereby making it more difficult for any
single person who wants to gain illegal access to the se-
cret information; he must convince the other party to go
along, and he risks discovery in the process.
How can Alice implement this procedure? From her
original message, she creates two coded messages one of
which is sent to Bob and the other to Charlie. Each of
the encrypted messages contains no information about
her original message, but together they contain the com-
plete message. Therefore, neither Bob nor Charlie alone
can find out what Alice wants to do, but the two of them
acting together can. This can be accomplished by taking
the original message, which we can think of as a binary
bit string, and adding to it a random bit string of the
same length. The addition is done modulo 2 and bitwise.
Alice then takes this string and a copy of the random
string and sends one to Bob and the other to Charlie. At
this point neither is in a position to learn Alice’s mes-
sage. However, if they get together and add their two
strings together, bitwise and modulo 2, Alice’s message
emerges. There are also classical protocols which allow
Alice to split her message into more than two parts.
So far we have not mentioned the problem of eaves-
dropping, but this is something Alice must consider. If
either a fourth party or the dishonest member of the
Bob-Charlie pair gains access to both of Alice’s trans-
missions, then they can learn the contents of her mes-
sage. Eavesdroppers can, however, be defeated by using
quantum cryptographic protocols. Quantum cryptogra-
phy provides for the secure transmission of information
by enabling one to determine whether an eavesdropper
has attempted to gain information about the key which
is being used to encode the message [2–4]. If not, the key
can be used and the information sent by using it will be
secure, and if an eavesdropper has been detected, then
one has to establish a new key.
We would like to show that it is possible to com-
bine quantum cryptography with secret sharing in a way
that will allow one to determine whether an eavesdrop-
per has been active during the secret sharing protocol.
The most obvious way of doing this is simply for Al-
ice to use quantum cryptographic protocols to send each
of the bit strings which result from the classical secret
sharing procedure, and this method will work. It is,
however, awkward. One first must establish mutual keys
among different pairs of parties, in this case one for Alice
and Bob, and another for Alice and Charlie, and then
implement the classical procedure. The classical proce-
dure, it should be pointed out, becomes more and more
complicated the larger the number of pieces into which
one wants to split the message. We would like to ex-
plore an alternative which uses quantum mechanics to
do both the information splitting and the eavesdropper
protection simultaneously. By using multiparticle entan-
glement, it eliminates the need to perform the classical
secret-splitting procedure altogether.
The method for splitting a message into two parts,
which we present here uses maximally entangled three-
particle states, or GHZ states, and it can be easily ex-
tended in two different ways. First, it can be modified to
allow Alice to send a string of qubits to Bob and Charlie
in such a way that only by working together can they
determine what the string is. In this case it is quantum
information which has been split into two pieces, neither
of which separately contains the original information, but
whose combination does. Second, the procedure can also
be generalized to more than three parties, and we show
explicitly how it works with four.
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GHZ states have already found a number of uses. They
form the basis of a very stringent test of local realistic the-
ories [6]. Recently it was also proposed that they can used
for cryptographic conferencing or for multiparticle gen-
eralizations of superdense coding [7]. In addition, related
states can be used to reduce communication complexity
[8]. Quantum secret sharing represents yet another ap-
plication.
II. GHZ STATES AND SECRET SHARING
Let us suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie each have
one particle from a GHZ triplet which is in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉). (1)
They each choose at random whether to measure their
particle in the x or y direction. They then announce
publicly in which direction they have made a measure-
ment, but not the results of their measurements. Half
the time, Bob and Charlie, by combining the results of
their measurements, can determine what the result of Al-
ice’s measurement was. This allows Alice to establish a
joint key with Bob and Charlie, which she can then use
to send her message.
Let us see how this works in more detail. Define the x
and y eigenstates
|+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉); |+ y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉);
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉); | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉). (2)
We can see the effects of measurements by Alice and Bob
on the state of Charlie’s particle, if we express the GHZ
state in different ways. Noting that
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉 + | − x〉); |1〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉 − | − x〉) (3)
we can write
|ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
[(|+ x〉a|+ x〉b + | − x〉a| − x〉b)(|0〉c + |1〉c)
+ (|+ x〉a| − x〉b + | − x〉a|+ x〉b)(|0〉c − |1〉c)] . (4)
This decomposition of |ψ〉 tells us what happens if both
Alice and Bob make measurements in the x direction. If
they both get the same result, then Charlie will have the
state (|0〉c+ |1〉c)/
√
2, and if they get different results he
will have the state (|0〉c − |1〉c)/
√
2. He can determine
which of these states he has by performing a measure-
ment along the x direction. The following table summa-
rizes the effects of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements on
Charlie’s state:
Alice
+x −x +y −y
+x |0〉+ |1〉 |0〉 − |1〉 |0〉 − i|1〉 |0〉+ i|1〉
Bob −x |0〉 − |1〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |0〉+ i|1〉 |0〉 − i|1〉
+y |0〉 − i|1〉 |0〉+ i|1〉 |0〉 − |1〉 |0〉+ |1〉
−y |0〉+ i|1〉 |0〉 − i|1〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |0〉 − |1〉
Alice’s measurements are given in the columns and Bob’s
are given in the rows. Charlie’s state, up to normaliza-
tion, appears in the boxes. From the table it is clear that
if Charlie knows what measurements Alice and Bob made
(that is, x or y), he can determine whether their results
are the same or opposite, and also that he will gain no
knowledge of what their results actually are. Similarly,
Bob will not be able to determine what Alices’s result is
without Charlie’s assistance, because he does not know if
his result is the same as Alice’s, or the opposite of hers.
With each party choosing to make x or y measurements
at random, only half of the GHZ triplets will give use-
ful results. For example, if Alice and Bob both measure
their particles in the x direction, Charlie must also mea-
sure his in the x direction in order to determine whether
the results of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are corre-
lated or anticorrelated; if he measures in the y direction
he gains no information. Because Charlie is choosing his
measurement direction at random, he will only choose
correctly half the time. This is why all three parties must
announce the directions of their measurements, so that
they can decide whether to keep or to discard the results
from a given triplet. This announcement should be done
in the following way: Bob and Charlie both send to Alice
the direction of their measurements who then sends all
three measurement directions to Bob and Charlie.
Before presenting a more general discussion of eaves-
dropping, we shall consider a specific situation in order
to show that it can be detected. Suppose that Bob is dis-
honest and that he has managed to get a hold of Charlie’s
particle as well as his own. He then measures the two par-
ticles and sends one of them on to Charlie. His object
is to discover what Alice’s bit is, without any assistance
from Charlie, and to do so in a way that cannot be de-
tected. Alice has measured her particle in either the x
or y direction, but Bob does not know which. He would
like to measure the quantum state of his two-particle sys-
tem, but because he does not know what measurement
Alice made, he does not know whether to make his in the
(|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 basis or in the |00〉 ± i|11〉)/√2 basis.
Choosing at random he has a probability of 1/2 of mak-
ing a mistake. If he chooses correctly, he will know, for
valid combinations of measurement axes, what the result
of Charlie’s measurement is from the result of his own,
and this means he will then know what Alice’s bit is. For
example, if Alice measured in the x direction and found
|+ x〉, then the state Bob receives is |00〉+ |11〉)/√2. If
Bob now measures in the |00〉±|11〉)/√2 basis, he knows
what the two- particle state is, and because
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+ x〉|+ x〉+ | − x〉| − x〉). (5)
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Bob knows that Charlie’s measurement will produce a
result identical to his.
What happens if he is wrong? Suppose that Alice has
measured her particle in the y direction and that Bob
measures his particles in the (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 basis. He
has a probability of 1/2 of getting either basis vector.
He now sends one of his particles to Charlie, and both
Bob and Charlie measure their particles. Because Alice
measured y, in order for this round of measurements to
produce a valid key bit, Bob and Charlie must make dif-
ferent measurements, i. e. one must measure x and the
other y. We note that in the (|00〉± |11〉)/√2 basis there
is no correlation between x and y measurements, for ex-
ample
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1
2
[
e−ipi/4(|+ x〉|+ y〉+ | − x〉| − y〉)
+ eipi/4(|+ x〉| − y〉+ | − x〉|+ y〉)
]
. (6)
Therefore, in half the situations the results of the mea-
surements will be wrong. If, for example, Alice found
| + y〉 and Bob found | + x〉, then Charlie should mea-
sure | − y〉 if he measures his particle in the y direction,
but because of Bob’s measurement, he has a probability
of 1/2 of finding | + y〉. The overall probability of an
error in this cheating scheme is 1/4, one half of picking
the wrong basis and then one half of getting the wrong
result.
There are two additional points to notice here. First,
if Bob were able to learn the direction of Alice’s and
Charlie’s measurements before having to reveal his, he
could cheat more successfully. In the cases in which he
made the wrong measurement, Bob could simply tell Al-
ice a measurement direction which would cause the re-
sults from that triplet to be thrown out. Alice and Char-
lie would, however, notice a higher than usual failure rate,
75 % as opposed to 50 %, which would tell them that
something unusual was happening. Insisting that Bob
send a measurement direction to Alice before learning
what kind of measurement Alice and Charlie makes this
kind of cheating more difficult. Second, there is also the
possibility that Bob could lie at certain points in the pro-
cedure; he could lie about his measurement direction or
about the result of his measurement. In the cheating
scheme considered above he gains, however, nothing by
doing so.
Now let us look at a more general situation. We as-
sume that there is an eavesdropper, Eve (who could also
be either Bob or Charlie). Her problem, as in the exam-
ple which we just discussed, is that she does not know
what bases have been or will be used to measure the
particles. If she measures them herself, and chooses the
wrong bases, she will introduce errors which Alice, Bob
and Charlie will be able to detect by publicly comparing
a subset of their measurements.
In order to show this for a large class of measurements,
let us assume that Eve has been able to entangle an an-
cilla with the three particle state which Alice, Bob, and
Charlie are using. At some later time she can measure
the ancilla to gain information about the measurement
results of Alice, Bob and Charlie. The state describing
the state of the three particles and the ancilla is
|Ψ〉 =
1∑
j,k,n=0
|jkn〉3|Rjkn〉ξ, (7)
where |jkn〉3 is a state of the three particles, and |Rjkn〉ξ
is an unnormalized ancilla state. What we wish to show
is that if this entanglement introduces no errors into the
secret sharing procedure, then |Ψ〉 must be a product of
a GHZ triplet and the ancilla. This implies that Eve will
gain no information about measurements on the triplet
from observing the ancilla, or, conversely, if Eve is to
gain information about Alice’s bit, she must invariably
introduce errors.
First, suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie all measure
their particles in the x basis. If no errors are to occur we
must have that
p(C = +x|A = ±x,B = ±x) = 1;
p(C = −x|A = ±x,B = ∓x) = 1, (8)
where p(C = +x|A = +x,B = +x) is the probability
that Charlie measures +x given that both Alice and Bob
measure +x, and the other quantities are similarly de-
fined. These equations imply that
P (+x,+x,−x)|Ψ〉 = 0; P (−x,−x,−x)|Ψ〉 = 0;
P (+x,−x,+x)|Ψ〉 = 0; P (−x,+x,+x)|Ψ〉 = 0, (9)
where P (+x,+x,−x) is the projection onto the subspace
of the three particle-ancilla Hilbert space in which Al-
ice’s particle is in the +x direction, Bob’s is in the +x
direction, and Charlie’s is in the −x direction. The other
projection operators are defined in a similar manner. Ex-
pressing the conditions in Eq. (9) in the z basis (the
|0〉, |1〉 basis), we find that if projection operators corre-
sponding to any of the vectors
1√
2
(|000〉3 − |111〉3); 1√
2
(|100〉3 − |011〉3);
1√
2
(|010〉3 − |101〉3); 1√
2
(|110〉3 − |001〉3), (10)
act on |Ψ〉, the result is zero.
Now suppose that Alice measures her particle in the x
basis, and Bob and Charlie measure theirs in the y basis.
In order for their to be no errors we must have that
p(C = −y|A = ±x,B = ±y) = 1;
p(C = +y|A = ±x,B = ∓y) = 1, (11)
which imply that
P (+x,+y,+y)|Ψ〉 = 0; P (−x,−y,+y)|Ψ〉 = 0;
P (+x,−y,−y)|Ψ〉 = 0, P (−x,+y,−y)|Ψ〉 = 0. (12)
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Again expressing these conditions in the z basis we find
that projection operators corresponding to the vectors
1√
2
(|000〉3 − |111〉3); 1√
2
(|100〉3 − |011〉3);
1√
2
(|010〉3 + |101〉3); 1√
2
(|110〉3 + |001〉3), (13)
annihilate |Ψ〉.
So far we have six vectors to which the three-particle
part of |Ψ〉 must be orthogonal. A seventh, (|100〉3 +
|011〉3)/
√
2, emerges when we demand that no errors oc-
cur when Alice measures her particle in the y direction,
Bob measures his in the x direction, and Charlie mea-
sures his in the y direction. These conditions imply that
|Ψ〉 must be of the form
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉3 + |111〉3)|R〉ξ, (14)
i. e. a product of the GHZ state and an ancilla state,
which is what we wished to show.
Finally, let us conclude this section with a discussion
of the resources necessary to implement quantum secret
sharing protocols. In order to send a shared key contain-
ing N bits it is necessary to use, on average 2N GHZ
triplets. If we instead use standard quantum cryptogra-
phy and the classical secret sharing protocol, then either
4N entangled pairs, using the Ekert procedure [ [3]], or
4N particles, using the BB84 procedure [ [2]], are re-
quired. In all cases, the number of particles sent from
Alice to Bob and Charlie is 4N . In the GHZ scheme,
once the key has been established, Alice needs to send N
classical bits in order to transmit the message. These bits
can be sent to either Bob or Charlie using a public chan-
nel. In the hybrid quantum-classical scheme Alice must
send 2N classical bits once keys with Bob and Charlie
have been established - N bits to send the random string
to Charlie and another N bits to send to Bob the string
resulting from the bitwise XOR of the message and the
random string. In general, the more parts into which
the secret is split, the greater the difference between the
number of classical bits which must be sent in the hybrid
scheme and in the entangled-state scheme (MN versus
N for a secret split into M parts). We see that entangle-
ment is able to act as a substitute for transmitted random
bits.
III. SPLITTING OF QUANTUM INFORMATION
Now suppose that Alice has a string of qubits she would
like to send to Bob and Charlie in such a way that they
must cooperate in order to extract the quantum informa-
tion. She can use shared GHZ triplets, |000〉abc+|111〉abc,
and a procedure very similar to quantum teleportation
to do this [5]. The no-cloning theorem implies that only
one copy of Alice’s qubit can be received, so that either
Bob or Charlie, but not both, will posses the final qubit
[9]. The procedure we shall present is symmetric in that
either party can end up with the final qubit, but infor-
mation from the other party is required before this can
happen. Security could be enforced by requiring that
Bob and Charlie meet in person to exchange the final in-
formation and put the qubit to its final use. Let us now
look in detail at the procedure for sending one qubit.
We shall first describe the protocol, and then discuss the
reasons for some of the steps.
Alice begins by taking her qubit, which is in the state
α|0〉A + β|1〉A, combining it with her GHZ particle, and
measuring the pair in the Bell basis
|Ψ±〉Aa = 1√
2
(|00〉Aa ± |11〉Aa);
|Φ±〉Aa = 1√
2
(|01〉Aa ± |10〉Aa). (15)
We can determine the effect of this measurement on the
particles which Bob and Charlie possess by expressing
the entire four-particle state as
|Ψ〉4 = 1
2
[|Ψ+〉Aa(α|00〉bc + β|11〉bc) + |Ψ−〉Aa(α|00〉bc − β|11〉bc)
+|Φ+〉Aa(β|00〉bc + α|11〉bc) + |Φ−〉Aa(−β|00〉bc + α|11〉bc)]. (16)
At this point Alice does not tell either Bob or Char-
lie what the result of her measurement is. This implies
that the single-particle density matrixes of both Bob’s
and Charlie’s particles are (1/2)I, where I is the 2 × 2
identity matrix, so that at this stage of the procedure nei-
ther Bob nor Charlie has any information about Alice’s
qubit. Alice now tells either Bob or Charlie (she makes
the choice at random) to measure his particle. It is the
person who has not been chosen whose particle will con-
tain the final qubit. The party which has been chosen to
make the measurement, whom we shall assume to be Bob
for this particular qubit, now measures his particle in the
x direction, obtaining either |+ x〉b or | − x〉b. This still
leaves Charlie’s single-particle density matrix as (1/2)I,
i. e. he still has no information about Alice’s qubit.
In order to reconstruct Alice’s qubit Charlie needs two
bits of classical information from Alice (which of the four
Bell states she found) and one from Bob. Alice first
verifies that both parties have received a particle, which
we assume can be done over a public channel, and then
sends Charlie the result of her measurement. If Alice’s
result was either |Ψ+〉Aa or |Ψ−〉Aa, then Charlie’s single-
4
particle density matrix is
ρc = |α|2|0〉c c〈0|+ |β|2|1〉c c〈1|, (17)
and if the result was either |Φ+〉Aa or |Φ−〉Aa, then it is
ρc = |β|2|0〉c c〈0|+ |α|2|1〉c c〈1|. (18)
Charlie now has amplitude information about Alice’s
qubit, but knows nothing about its phase. Bob’s one bit
of classical information, in conjunction with the quan-
tum information he now has, will give him the phase
information and allow him to reconstruct Alice’s qubit.
In particular, the transformation which Charlie should
perform in order to obtain Alice’s qubit, up to an overall
sign, are
|Ψ+〉Aa|+ x〉b → I; |Φ+〉Aa|+ x〉b → σx;
|Ψ+〉Aa| − x〉b → σz ; |Φ+〉Aa| − x〉b → σxσz;
|Ψ−〉Aa|+ x〉b → σz ; |Φ−〉Aa|+ x〉b → σxσz ;
|Ψ−〉Aa| − x〉b → I; |Φ−〉Aa| − x〉b → σx. (19)
We see, then, that Charlie can reconstruct Alice’s state
but only with the assistance of Bob. Bob must both mea-
sure his particle and send the result to Charlie. Without
Bob’s information, Charlie has no information about the
phase of Alice’s state.
Let us now discuss this procedure. We are making
the assumption that any communication over a classical
channel is insecure. This means we cannot consider the
simplest method of splitting the quantum information in
Alice’s qubit, which is just to use standard teleportation
with an EPR pair and send the classical information to
Bob and the second particle in the EPR pair to Charlie
[10]. That is why the procedure we have outlined above
is somewhat more complicated. Note that we could se-
curely implement this protocol if Alice sent her two bits
using standard quantum cryptography. She would on
average, however, need 4 particles to do so, and an en-
tangled pair to implement the teleportation procedure.
In addition this procedure will require that five measure-
ments be made, on average. The scheme we have pre-
sented requires a single GHZ triplet, and two measure-
ments. In effect, it substitutes entanglement for quantum
mechanically implemented classical communication.
Our next task is to see how it protects against cheating
and eavesdropping. Let us first note that is Alice’s ability
to choose which particle, Bob’s or Charlie’s, is to receive
the final qubit prevents cheating by one of the parties if
they manage to get a hold of both of the particles which
Alice sends. Suppose, for example, that Charlie is dis-
honest, that he has managed to obtain both particles,
and that he has sent a particle which he has prepared
to Bob. If Alice chooses Charlie to receive the qubit, his
cheating will go undetected; one Charlie has the result
of Alice’s measurement he has her qubit, and the result
of Bob’s measurement is irrelevant. On the other hand,
if she chooses Bob, then Charlie has a problem. At the
time he sent the particle to Bob, Charlie did not know the
result of Alice’s measurement, and therefore the particle
he sent to Bob is not in the proper quantum state. Alice
and Bob can detect this by comparing a subset of the
states Bob received to the ones Alice sent, which would
reveal Charlie’s cheating.
This procedure also guarantees that if an eavesdrop-
per or a cheater has entangled an ancilla with the three-
particle state, then errors will be introduced. If the GHZ
state in the above protocol is replaced by the state in Eq.
(7), then one can show, using an argument similar to the
one in the previous section, that if no errors are intro-
duced by the addition of the ancilla, then the state |Ψ〉
is just a product of the GHZ state and an ancilla state.
This again implies that measurements on the ancilla will
tell an eavesdropper nothing about the state of the three
particles held by Alice, Bob, and Charlie.
IV. FOUR-PARTICLE GHZ STATE
It is possible to generalize this procedure to split infor-
mation among more than two people. Let us look specifi-
cally at the case of three. Alice starts with a four-particle
GHZ state,
|ψ〉4 = 1√
2
(|0000〉+ |1111〉), (20)
keeps one particle for herself and gives one particle each
to Bob, Charlie, and Diana. Her object is to generate
a shared key bit which can only be figured out by Bob,
Charlie, and Diana if they cooperate.
A method of accomplishing this can be found by ex-
pressing the state |ψ〉4 in different combinations of x and
y bases. If the state is expressed completely in the x
basis,
|ψ〉4 = 1
4
√
2

∏
j
(|+ x〉j + | − x〉j) +
∏
j
(|+ x〉j − | − x〉j)

 ,
(21)
where j runs over the set {Alice, Bob, Charlie, Diana},
we see that the right-hand side is an an equal superpo-
sition of all four-particle basis states, where each single
particle state is in the x basis, with an even number of
−x states. This means that if all four people have each
measured their particles in the x direction, then Bob,
Charlie and Diana can, by combining their results, deter-
mine what the result of Alice’s measurement was. They
simply count the number of −x measurements, and if it
is even, then Alice must have found +x, and if it is odd,
then Alice must have measured −x. It is necessary for
all three of them to combine their information in order
to determine Alice’s result, no subset will do. Therefore,
Alice has succeeded in splitting her message into three
parts.
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In order to foil eavesdroppers and cheaters, the four
parties do not want to use only a single basis, so we must
examine what happens if different combinations of x and
y bases are used. Expressing |ψ〉4 in the y basis we find
that it is an equal superposition of all four-particle basis
states, where each single particle state is in the y basis,
with an even number of | − y〉 states. This allows Bob,
Charlie and Diana to determine Alice’s state in the same
way as in the x basis case. If two of the particles are ex-
pressed in the x basis and two in the y basis, then we see
that |ψ〉4 is an equal superposition of the 16 basis vectors
with two particles in the x basis and two in the y basis
(with the same two in the x basis and the same two in the
y basis in each of the four-particle basis vectors) which
have an odd number of minus states. For example, if the
first two particles are expressed in the x basis and the
second two in the y basis, the states |−x〉|+x〉|+y〉|+y〉
and |−x〉|+x〉|−y〉|−y〉 would appear in the expansion of
|ψ〉4. Again, Bob, Charlie, and Diana can determine Al-
ice’s state by counting the number of minus states which
appeared as results of their measurements.
If three particles are expressed in one basis and the
remaining one in the other, then |ψ〉4 is a superposition
of all 16 basis vectors. This means that there are no cor-
relations among the measurements which will allow Bob,
Charlie, and Diana to infer the result of Alice’s mea-
surement. If all four parties are choosing their bases at
random, this means that in half the cases, they will not
be able to use the results.
Summarizing, each of the four parties performs a mea-
surement on their particle in either the x or y basis. They
then communicate their choice of basis to Alice (classi-
cally) who decides if the overall basis choice is a usable
one, and she then communicates all four basis choices to
each of the other three parties. Using this information
and the results of their measurements, they can, if they
act in concert, determine the result of Alice’s measure-
ment. This means that Alice, on the one hand, and Bob,
Charlie, and Diana on the other, will have, on repeating
this process, a shared key. A calculation similar to the
one presented in Section 2 shows that if an eavesdropper
tries to entangle an ancilla with the four-particle GHZ
state, then she will invariably introduce errors, and her
presence can be detected.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that GHZ states can be used to split
information in such a way that if one is in possession of
all of the parts, the information can be recovered, but if
one has only some of the parts, it cannot. This applies
to both classical and quantum information. In the case
of classical information a shared key can be established
between one party and several others all of whom must
work in concert. An eavesdropper or a cheater will intro-
duce errors and can thereby be detected. In the case of
quantum information the information in a qubit is split
into two parts so that if the parts are recombined, the
qubit can be recovered.
This represents a different kind of information splitting
than occurs in quantum copiers [11]. There the object is
to split the information in one qubit into two parts so
that each part contains as much information about the
original qubit as possible. However, in that case one can-
not reconstruct the original qubit by combining the two
copies.
The key point in all of this is that multiparticle entan-
gled states can be used to split information into parts.
This can be useful in maintaining security, as has been
shown here, but there may be applications in the pro-
cessing of quantum information as well.
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